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BOOK REVIEW:
BIOETHICS BEYOND THE HEADLINES:
WHO LIVES? WHO DIES? WHO DECIDES?
Authored by: Dr. Albert R. Jonsen*
Bioethics Beyond the Headlines. Who Lives? Who Dies? Who Decides?
is a book about the growing interest in bioethics and the study of the
ethical questions involved in medical science and practice. It is written
for the general reader who sees daily media stories about complex
topics such as stem cell research, euthanasia, organ transplantation,
genetic diagnosis and therapy and other "medical miracles" that offer
great benefits but equally perplexing problems. The author, one of the
pioneers in the field of bioethics, attempts to explain in plain language
what the ethical problems are and how bioethicists attempt to deal with
them.
LESS BULL, BETTER BIOETHICS
Reviewed by: Dr. Jerry Menikoff **
Over the several weeks this was being written, headlines raced across
the globe, heralding unsavory doings in the laboratory of the leading
Korean stem cell researcher. The story was initially broken by the
Washington Post on November 12 with the headline: "U.S. Scientist
Leaves Joint Stem Cell Project; Alleged Ethical Breaches By South
Korean Cited."1 The article went on to note how stem cell pioneer
Hwang Woo Suk had obtained some of the human eggs used in his
work from junior researchers in his laboratory. It noted that if this was
true, his actions would be "in violation of widely held ethics principles
that preclude people in positions of authority from accepting egg
donations from underlings.",
2
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' Rick Weiss, U.S. Scientist Leaves Joint Stem Cell Project; Alleged Ethical Breaches
By South Korean Cited, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 12, 2005, at A2.2id.
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The Washington Post article also noted that Dr. Hwang might
have paid the women for providing the eggs, an action that also was
described as highly problematic. A researcher at Harvard's Stem Cell
Institute was quoted as saying that such payments were in violation of
guidelines adopted by the National Academy of Sciences: "There is a
right way and a wrong way, and we must be sure to perform this vitally
important medical research the right way." 3 Within two weeks of the
revelations, Dr. Hwang admitted that two junior researchers had indeed
supplied egs and that about 20 of the women who supplied eggs had
been paid. He subsequently stepped down as director of the Korean
stem cell center. Leading U.S. bioethicist Arthur Caplan co-authored an
op-ed claiming that these events demonstrated the need for the U.S. to
be playing a prominent role in stem cell research, since otherwise
"ethics can get forgotten" as other nations race to be leaders in this
field.5
Hold on a minute. Was everything quite as black-and-white as
some of these headlines suggested? Yes, Dr. Hwang had indeed
breached commitments to not use his subordinates as sources for eggs
and to not pay for the eggs. But to what extent were these two practices
violations of "widely held ethical principles"? It is interesting to note
that in the United States, which has an extensive and long-standing set
of regulations designed to protect human subjects, there is no general
prohibition against enrolling a subordinate in a research study. The
official Institutional Review Board Guidebook notes that the "issues
with respect to employees as research subjects are essentially identical
to those involving students as research subjects: coercion and undue
influence, and confidentiality.",6 While it notes that special attention
needs to be given to make sure that such subjects are not enrolling as a
result of coercion or undue influence, it does not recommend an
3 id.
4 James Brooke, Korean Leaves Cloning Center in Ethics Furor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
25, 2005 at Al. The discussion in the text is limited to the ethical issues relating to the
recruitment and payment of egg donors. Dr. Hwang was subsequently accused of
having fabricated substantial portions of a major paper. See, e.g., Nicholas Wade,
Korean Scientist Said to Admit Fabrication in a Cloning Study, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2005, at Al. Those accusations, if true, would indeed constitute major violations of
"widely held ethical principles."
5 Arthur Caplan & Glenn McGee, U.S. Must Support, Regulate Stem Cell Research,
TIMES UNION, Nov. 20, 2005 at E 1.
6 ROBIN LEVIN PENSLAR, PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS: INSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK, at 6-55 (2d ed. 1993).
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outright ban on the use of this category of subjects.7 As for Dr.
Hwang's subordinates, there have been few, if any, details regarding
the conditions under which he obtained eggs from them. Thus, at best
we can say that we don't really have enough information to know
whether their participation was truly voluntary. Indeed, the New York
Times, writing about Dr. Hwang's resignation less than two weeks after
the Washington Post expos6, concluded that at the time the egg
donations took place, they "were not considered a legal or ethical
violation."
8
And what about the second issue raised with regard to Dr.
Hwang's conduct: the fact that he paid these women to supply eggs? As
the Harvard stem cell researcher noted, this was the "wrong way"
according to the National Academy of Sciences ("NAS") guidelines.
The NAS guidelines, however, represent solely the views of that body,
which merely acts as an advisor to the federal government. The federal
government has not even adopted the guidelines. Thus, they have no
binding legal authority. Indeed, these guidelines were developed under
unusual circumstances, since the federal government had not even
asked for any advice from the NAS, as would be the usual case before
the NAS gives its advice. The NAS produced the guidelines in
furtherance of an explicit goal, to promote stem cell research, faulting
the federal government for its inaction in this area.9
Moreover, anyone who reads the actual guidelines, at least with
regards to paying subjects, will discover that this aspect of them
actually does not have that much to do with ethics. The guidelines
themselves note that "paying research subjects is 'a common and long-
standing practice in the United States."' 10 The reason for that practice
7 See id at 6-52 - 6-55.8 Brooke, supra note 4, at Al.
9 See Nicholas Wade, Scientists Draft Rules for Ethics on Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 27, 2005, Al. It is interesting to note that the NAS guidelines say very little
about many of the most controversial aspects of stem cell research, such as whether it
is ethical to create new embryos as a source of stem cells. The guidelines deal with
such issues by proposing the creation of special ethics committees to review each
research study involving stem cells. However, the standards that the committees
would use to approve or disapprove such studies are not made clear.
10 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL AND INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMIES, GUIDELINES FOR HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH 85 (2005)
[hereinafter NRCIM]. The Guidelines also would likely not have permitted Dr.
Hwang's collection of eggs from his subordinates. Id. at 85 quoting N. Dickert et al.,
Paying research subjects: an Analysis of Current Policies. 136 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 368 (2002); and J.A. Anderson & C. Weijer, The Research Subject as Wage
Earner, 23 THEORETICAL MED. AND BIOETHICS 359 (2002).
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appears to be that "moral principles of fairness and gratitude support
providing payment to those who bear the burdens of research on behalf
of society."" The guidelines, nonetheless, went on to recommend that,
although there is not a consensus on the ethics relating to payment, egg
(or sperm) donors should not receive any payments in excess of
reimbursement for their direct expenses for donation.' 2 In making that
recommendation, however, the guidelines state that it was in part
because such payments "raise concerns that might undermine public
confidence" in stem cell research. 13 Indeed, they go on to specifically
note the "strengths of all the arguments surrounding this issue," which
include the argument that substantial payments to egg donors (who bear
substantial risks and inconveniences) are not only permissible, but
should be required as a matter of good ethics. 14 Thus, the NAS itself is
acknowledging that its anti-payment position has more to do with good
public relations-avoiding any policies that might cause public
controversy over stem cell research-than with ethics.
A New Primer on Bioethics
Lest anyone have thought that the events in early 2005 surrounding the
withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition from Terri Schiavo were
a fluke, this more recent story provides additional support for
concluding that bioethics discussions in the media can leave a person
less than fully informed about what is really going on. And when
people find themselves in the situation of wanting a better
understanding of such events, they might consider reaching for a copy
of Albert Jonsen's new book, Bioethics Beyond the Headlines.
Jonsen, Emeritus Professor of Ethics in Medicine at the University of
Washington, has played a founding role in the field of bioethics. He has
been influential in a number of ways,' 6 not least by being a prolific
writer. Among other things, he is lead author of one of the most
1 NRCIM, supra note 10, at 85.
12 See id at 85 - 87.
I3 d. at 87.
14 id.
15 ALBERT R. JONSEN, BIOETHIcs BEYOND THE HEADLINES: WHO LivEs? WHO DIES?
WHO DECIDES? (2005).
16 He has served as a member of several prominent bioethics commissions, including
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, and the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine.
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influential clinical ethics handbooks (now in its fifth edition), 17 and is
author or co-author of three scholarly works on the history of
bioethics. 1
8
Bioethics Beyond the Headlines is a change from his usual
writings, in that it is directed at the general public. Recognizing that
complex bioethical issues are often presented by the media "in
superficial and inaccurate terms,' 19 Jonsen attempts to provide a more
substantive explanation of the most common bioethical issues. The
book, a relatively concise 208 pages, is divided into three sections. The
first section deals with the core topics of clinical bioethics, including
the important role of patient autonomy and its significance in informed
consent and in decisions to forgo life support. This section also covers
the definition of death, euthanasia, organ transplantation, assisted
reproduction and abortion. The second section is devoted to ethical
issues that arise not as part of the clinical encounter between a patient
and a doctor, but instead out of our efforts to advance our knowledge.
Thus, in this section, Jonsen addresses the rules to protect people who
participate as subjects in research studies. He also covers the major hot-
button topics in medical research, including genetics, neuroscience,
cloning and stem cell research. The final section is directed at topics
that he describes as being "beyond the usual borders" of bioethics. Here
he addresses a topic that is of growing prominence: the ethical issues
relating to access to health care (including the inability of many people
to afford such care). Another major topic dealt with here is that of
"ethical relativism": how should we deal with differences in cultural
beliefs (such as it being common among certain Asians to not tell a
person with terminal cancer that he has a fatal illness) while still being
true to the ethical principles that we generally apply in this country?
The final two chapters in this section address animal ethics and
environmental ethics.
20
Obviously, a book of this size cannot provide a comprehensive
treatment of such a wide range of topics, nor does Jonsen intend it to do
so. He describes the book as a primer, one that will serve as a curious
17 ALBERT R. JONSEN, MARK SIEGLER, & WILLIAM J. WINSLADE, CLIMCAL ETHICS( 5th ed. 2002).
18 ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE BIRTH OF BIOETHICS (1998); ALBERT. R. JONSEN, A
SHORT HISTORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1999); ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN
TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING (1988).
19 JONSEN, supra note 15, back cover.
20 The book also has three appendices, providing a "Pr6cis of Moral Philosophy," a
"Pr6cis of the History of Medical Ethics," and discussing the "Frankenstein
Analogy."
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reader's introduction to this area. 2 1 Thus, people who already have a
fairly extensive background in bioethics should probably go elsewhere
for their next bioethics book. But with regard to his chosen audience,
Jonsen succeeds admirably in his goals. The book is written in a clear
and engaging style, and nicely blends a description of current issues
with quite a bit of the historical background, which has been one of
Jonsen's lifetime interests. Consistent with the title, most of the
chapters are constructed around what appear to be actual newspaper
headlines, thus allowing Jonsen to demonstrate how a deeper analysis
of a topic will enrich the understanding one might otherwise get from
merely a headline or sound bite. He generally avoids the common fault
of quickly deciding that one or another view is the "correct" one (a
practice that of course does not make for exciting news headlines),
noting that in bioethics there often is not a consensus regarding the
right answer. 22 There is relatively little jargon or technical terminology;
people who are looking for extensive discussions of Kant or deontology
will not find it here.
What the reader does get, happily, is the wisdom of one of the
leading bioethicists, distilled into a very palatable form. A person could
do far worse in selecting their first bioethics book. And, hopefully
Jonsen will also succeed in his second goal: he hopes this book will not
only provide readers with a background in bioethics, but also encourage
them to read further. He wants this primer to "prime" a reader's interest
for such further explorations. And there is an excellent chance that the
book will do just that.
Law and Bioethics
Since this review is appearing in a health law journal, it seems more
than appropriate to say something about the relationship between law
21 JONSEN, supra note 15, at 3.
22 In a book that covers most of bioethics, there will of course be the occasional
misstep. In his discussion of withdrawing care from patients in a persistent vegetative
state, Jonsen's comments might lead a reader to wrongly conclude that there is a wide
consensus in bioethics that keeping such persons alive falls within the category of
"futile" care. See id. at 37. He also occasionally misstates some legal points: He
comments that the legal standard for informed consent in the United States involves
determining what a reasonable person would want to be told (whereas in many states,
the standard still looks to what information a physician would generally provide). See
id. at 43. He states that in the Baby M case, In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J.
1988), the Supreme Court of New Jersey enforced a surrogacy contract, when it in
fact did just the opposite. Id. at 72. But these are very minor faults in a generally
excellent book.
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and bioethics. Time and again, legal issues pop up in Jonsen's book.
Within this book are mentions (generally brief) of: the Uniform
Determination of Death Act; the legal decisions regarding Karen Ann
Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan, Elizabeth Bouvia, and Terri Schiavo; the
Schloendorff v. The Society of the New York Hospital2 3 opinion; the
laws regarding refusals of care by Jehovah's Witnesses; the Supreme
Court decisions on physician-assisted suicide; the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act and the role of the United Network for Organ Sharing in
distributing organs; the Baby M case; Roe v. Wade2 4 and the federal
ban on partial birth abortions; and the federal regulations regarding
research with human subjects.
Given the frequency with which Jonsen brings up legal issues, it
is interesting to note his own viewpoint about the connection between
law and bioethics. He addresses this topic in the final paragraph of his
first chapter:
Inevitably, the questions of bioethics mingle with the
questions of the law. From the beginning of bioethics, legal
scholars have joined the discussion. Many cases involving
bioethical questions have come to the courts. Legislatures
have passed laws that reflect various bioethical positions.
So, it is impossible to describe the field of bioethics
without reference to "biolaw," and the reader will find
many references in the following pages. Despite the
prominence of law, a bioethics that seeks to alleviate the
human predicament must be, in essence, a philosophical
and theological enterprise.25
It seems, then, that he is somewhat apologetic about the amount of law
that shows up in the book, viewing it perhaps as a necessary but not
always welcome distraction from the philosophical and theological
analyses that form the core of bioethics.
Jonsen might be somewhat overstating the case in suggesting
that legal reasoning is a largely distinct endeavor from that of bioethical
analysis. The two might have more in common, particularly in areas of
the law where there is little statutory or similar guidance. Indeed, one
of Jonsen's own landmark works-The Abuse of Casuistry: A History
23 105 N.E. 92,211 N.Y. 125 (1914).
24410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973).
25 JONSEN, supra note 15, at 21.
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of Moral Reasoning 6-- describes how modem bioethical thinking owes
much to the religious case-based reasoning known as casuistry that was
popular hundreds of years ago. Any first-year law student would no
doubt recognize the similarity between casuistry and the type of
reasoning that courts undertake in answering questions relating to
common law. One of this nation's leading legal scholars, Cass R.
27Sunstein, devoted part of his 1994 Tanner Lectures to reaffirming the
importance of casuistry in modern legal decision-making.28 He noted
that case-based analysis (making legal decisions in a framework that
does not involve interpreting a specific "rule" such as a statute) plays a
vital role in our legal system, and that we should consider expanding
that role.29
Even assuming that legal reasoning and bioethical reasoning
sometimes follow similar procedures for coming to decisions, it might
nonetheless still be the case that these two disciplines apply those
procedures to wholly different types of substantive rules. But perhaps
even these substantive differences are not always as great as one might
suspect. One of the more fascinating academic legal debates in recent
years involved Judge Richard Posner's presentation in 1997 of the
Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law School, which he
titled The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory. Posner argued in
these lectures that (1) the work of academic philosophers who
specialize in moral issues is of little practical help in making decisions
about such issues,31 and (2) more particularly, moral theory should play
32
no role in making legal decisions. The Harvard Law Review
subsequently published Posner's lectures with accompanying critical
responses 33 from a "Who's Who" of legal luminaries: Ronald
26 JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 18.
27 Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School
and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago.
28 See generally Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995).
29 See id. at 958.
30 Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1638 (1998). Posner, consistent with his generally prolific nature, subsequently
expanded these ideas into a book, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999).
31 See Posner, supra note 30, at 1638 - 1692.
32 See id at 1693 
- 1709.
33 Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718 (1998); Charles
Fried, Philosophy Matters, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1739 (1998); Anthony T. Kronman,
The Value of Moral Philosophy, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1751 (1998); John T. Noonan,
Jr., Posner's Problematics, 111 HARv. L. REV. 1768 (1998); and Martha C.
Nussbaum, Still Worthy of Praise, 111 IIHARV. L. REV. 1776 (1998).
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Dworkin,34 Charles Fried,35 Anthony Kronman,36 John T. Noonan,
Jr.,37 and Martha C. Nussbaum.
38
These are all wonderful articles, discussing an extremely
complicated and important issue, and I will not even attempt to present
what would no doubt be an overly-simplistic summary here. The only
point to be made here is that several of this nation's great legal minds
strongly disagree with Posner's conclusions, and believe that moral
theory often plays a very significant role in determining what the law
is. Justice Fried, for example, states that
I am a judge, and I will reaffirm that my reading,
thinking and writing about moral, political and legal
philosophy makes a difference to my work. In fact, I
regularly test my work as a judge against the arguments
that have influenced my thinking about these more
academic matters .... [M]aterials of positive law are
interpreted in light of morality and in the last analysis
are accountable to it.
39
Dean Kronman notes that "Posner badly understates the real, if limited,
role that moral reflection can and must play in the decision of cases....
In reality, the role judges occupy is one in which the need for moral
reflection is steadier and more insistent than in almost any other
position. 40
In the clash of viewpoints between Posner and his critics, it is
especially noteworthy that the examples that are brought up by both
sides often are taken from the field of bioethics. Thus, both abortion
and physician-assisted suicide end up being discussed. And, upon
reflection, this is not very surprising. Issues in bioethics often constitute
so-called "hard cases" where we do not have a clear and explicit statute
to reference, which will provide an easy answer to a particular question.
In part, this is due to the rapid changes in technology that create new
34 Both Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University and Professor of Law and
Philosophy at New York University.
35 Former Harvard Law School professor and U.S. solicitor general, and Associate
Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
36 Dean of the Yale Law School.
37 Judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
38 Professor of Law and Ethics in the Law School, Philosophy Department, and the
Divinity School of the University of Chicago.
39 Fried, supra note 33, at 1743.
40 Kronman, supra note 33, at 1761-62.
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questions where previously none existed. (We need not have worried
about whether having gestated a child or being the genetic mother of a
child is a "stronger" sign of motherhood before technology allowed us
to have these two aspects residing in two different women). But
whatever the cause, it is nonetheless true that to the extent moral
reasoning may play a role in legal decision making, it is far more likely
to do so in the analysis of bioethics cases than in the more typical case.
Thus, the type of analysis that Jonsen provides in his book should be
particularly useful to a lawyer (whatever her role) who finds herself
confronting a legal issue that falls within the field of bioethics.
Hopefully Jonsen would not object to the notion that legal
decision-makers and commentators are indeed frequently paying
attention to the very same moral issues that concern bioethicists. And,
in Jonsen's spirit of priming a reader's interest, I will take this
opportunity to briefly provide a few appetizers, as it were: food for
thought showing how further reading in the legal literature relating to
some of the topics Jonsen addresses can contribute to the understanding
of the relevant ethical issues:
Selective Reduction. In his chapter on abortion, Jonsen
concludes with a discussion of how assisted reproductive technology
has caused a large increase in multiple gestation pregnancies (a woman
who is gestating, for example, four or more fetuses) and the unique
dilemma of selective reduction. Such pregnancies, given that the female
human body was not designed to carry such a large number of fetuses
to term, often result in all of the babies having major health problems.
By aborting one or more of the fetuses, an outcome can often be
produced where all of the babies have a much greater chance of being
healthy. Jonsen notes:
Presumably, parents want all of these babies; all fetuses
in the multiple gestation are wanted. One or several of
the fetuses poses a threat to its siblings. An ethicist
opposed to abortion simply would find no justification
for selective reduction. However, an ethicist opposed to
abortion generally but not universally might find a self-
defense justification. However, even then, it would not
be clear in most cases which fetus is the aggressor and
why. The "aggressor" is selected somewhat at random
(and is often the smallest fetus). Indeed, can mere
1142 [VOL.9.2:1133
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coexistence in the same womb count as aggression?...
Selective reduction is truly an ethical paradox. 41
The selective reduction issue naturally leads one to the
discussions in the legal literature regarding similar "coexistence"
problems. Anyone can benefit from rereading (or better yet, reading for
the first time, if they have not yet had the pleasure) Lon Fuller's classic
42article, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers. Fuller describes a case
in the far future (the year 4300), decided by the fictitious Supreme
Court of Newgarth.
The facts involved a party of amateur cave explorers who end
up being trapped underground as a result of a landslide.43 They are able
to remain in communication with the outside world.44 Learning that it
will take at least 10 days before they can be rescued, they talk with a
committee of physicians, which advises them that given their lack of
food and water, it is unlikely that they will be able to survive until the
rescuers reach them.45 They then ask if, were they to kill and eat one of
themselves, could they could survive long enough to be rescued.46 That
question was "reluctantly" answered in the affirmative.47 The explorers
all agree to throw dice to determine who is to be eaten, but in the
middle of the process of doing that, one of them decides to withdraw
from the arrangement. 48 The others force him to participate, and he
ends up being the loser; he is killed and eaten.
49
After the successful rescue, the survivors are tried for murder.
Fuller's article presents the opinions of the several justices on the
fictitious supreme court. 50 He constructed each opinion so that it
represents a particular point of view regarding where the law comes
from. 5' Fuller's thoughtful analysis of jurisprudence allows the reader
to explore how much (or how little) some views of law-making (such
as the natural law approach) might overlap with the type of ethical
decisions about right and wrong that Jonsen wrestles with in his book.
41 Jonsen, supra note 15, at 83.
42 Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L.REv. 616 (1949).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 617.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Fuller, supra note 42, at 617.
48 Id. at 618.
49 Id.
50 See generally id.
51 See generally id.
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Fuller's article continues to engage us more than a half-century after it
was written, regularly producing new commentary in the legal
literature. As recently as 2002, it was employed in analyzing a case
involving the separation of conjoined twins, which raises issues very
similar to those surrounding multiple gestations. 2
Withdrawal of Artificial Hydration and Nutrition. In discussing
the judicial review of Terri Schiavo's case, Jonsen notes the following:
Every [Florida] court recognized that much law existed
about similar cases and that, indeed, the U.S. Supreme
Court had ruled on a similar case. In 1990, it concluded in
the similar case of Nancy Cruzan that "a State may apply a
clear and convincing evidence standard in proceedings
where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and
hydration of a person in persistent vegetative state." 53
Jonsen is of course correct in noting the relevance of the Cruzan
54
decision to the legal analysis of Terri Schiavo's situation. And given
that obvious relevance, it is especially interesting to note the paucity of
references to that landmark opinion in the otherwise massive amounts
of media coverage that led up to Terri Schiavo's death on March 31,
2005. For example, between January 1 of that year and Schiavo's
death, the New York Times55 and the Washington Post56 each published
only two news articles by its reporters even mentioning the Cruzan
case.
The minimal attention given to that case during the Schiavo
media frenzy is especially surprising, given how much there is to learn
from Cruzan. In the Schiavo case, two of the most controversial issues
appeared to be (1) the allegedly lax burden of proof standard being
52 See Tom Stacy, Acts, Omissions, and the Necessity of Killing Innocents, 29 AM. J.
CPiM. L. 481, 486 - 99 (2002) (discussing Fuller's article, the conjoined twins
situation, and the nineteenth century real-life lifeboat case, Regina v. Dudley &
Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884)).
53 JONSEN, supra note 15, at 39 quoting the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
54 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
55 Denise Grady, The Best Way to Keep Control: Leave Instructions, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2005, F5; David D. Kirkpatrick & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, How Family's.
Cause Reached the Halls of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, Al.
56 Manuel Roig-Franzia, Catholic Stance on Tube-Feeding Is Evolving; Terri Schiavo
Case Reopens International Debate on Ethics and the End of Life, WASHINGTON
POST, Mar. 27, 2005, A7; Dana Milbank, Legal Experts Say Parents Are Unlikely To
Prevail, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 22, 2005, Al.
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applied by the Florida courts in deciding what Terri Schiavo would
have wanted done, and (2) the allegedly barbaric nature of allowing
someone to die as a result of withdrawal of artificial hydration and
nutrition. Cruzan squarely addressed both of those issues.
With regard to the burden of proof issue, the Cruzan decision
was actually rather controversial back in 1990. It determined, by only a
5-4 majority, that it was acceptable under the Constitution for a state to
require "clear and convincing" evidence of a person's wishes before
allowing life-sustaining medical care to be withdrawn. And, tellingly, it
was the more conservative block of the Court-including Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia-whose views were on that winning side.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for that majority accepted that a state, in
effect, could err on the side of life (where have we heard that concept
recently?!) by imposing the more demanding burden of proof The
more liberal dissenting four Justices would have not allowed a state to
impose such a strict standard; their view was that this type of standard
improperly kept people alive too long, unconstitutionally violating their
interest in having their wish to die-even if only supported by merely a
preponderance of the evidence-respected.
And in 2005, what was the relevant law in Florida applicable to
Terri Schiavo's case? Florida's statute explicitly required that there be
"clear and convincing" evidence of a patient's wishes before life-
sustaining care could be withdrawn. In other words, Florida applied the
strict standard that was at issue in the Cruzan case, a standard that - but
for the swing vote of a single Justice fifteen years earlier - might not
have even been constitutionally permissible. How odd, then, that during
the Schiavo case much of the media took no notice of the fact that an
evidentiary standard that strongly favored the "pro-life" viewpoint, and
that barely survived being upheld by the Supreme Court, was suddenly
being characterized by many as too generous in allowing people to die.
The Cruzan Court had also spoken to another of the most
controversial issues regarding Terri Schiavo: the acceptability of
allowing someone to die by withdrawing artificial hydration and
nutrition. Simply stated, that Court had determined that this issue was
not even very controversial back in 1990. Withdrawal of artificial
hydration and nutrition was to be treated in the same way as withdrawal
of any other form of medical care. Eight of the nine Justices accepted
this conclusion. Indeed, even Chief Justice Rehnquist-rarely
considered a wild-eyed liberal-writing for the majority, appeared to
acknowledge that the Constitution probably protected a person's right
to have artificial hydration and nutrition withdrawn.
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Again, how odd that relatively little attention was paid to these
facts by much of the media. Surely it was relevant that a practice that
fifteen years earlier was considered non-controversial, even
constitutionally protected, by some of the most conservative members
of the Supreme Court, was now being recharacterized as some type of
cruel invention for killing people off.
The Cruzan decision-each and every one of the various
opinions-remains a source of much wisdom, no matter what one's
political leanings might be. That fact makes it even worse that there has
been so little serious discussion of it in the major media, even as there
are calls for "tightening up" the burden of proof for allowing care to be
withdrawn from future patients. The issues addressed in that case,
regarding the appropriate burden of proof, were difficult ones back in
1990, and still remain difficult ones, even today. How to "properly"
make a decision for someone when we are not sure what she really
wants done remains a vexing problem, whether we treat it as one of law
or ethics. Whatever we decide, we will be doing a wrong to some
people by doing something to them that they would not have wanted
done. 5
Determining When a Person is Dead. One of the few issues that
was relatively non-controversial in the recent debate over Terri Schiavo
was the fact that she was not dead. This is the first substantive topic
that Jonsen addresses in his book.58 And even though many of those
who advocated withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration from
Schiavo might have felt that she should be considered dead (she was
perhaps "as good as dead"), and thus presumably her wishes would
then be irrelevant, such arguments were rarely made. To a significant
extent, that is because the debate about where to draw the line between
life and death took place decades ago, and is largely settled: a person
with a functioning brainstem and a beating heart does not meet the
legal definition of death in any state of the U.S.
But oddly enough, there is still an ongoing controversy about
one aspect of the definition of death. Jonsen notes the relatively recent
practice of obtaining organs for transplantation not only from people
who are declared dead under "brain death" criteria (their entire brain
has irreversibly ceased functioning, even though their hearts continue
to beat), but rather who die as a result of their heart ceasing to beat.
These people used to be called non-heart-beating donors, although the
57 See, e.g., JERRY MENIKOFF, LAW AND BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION 322-27
(2001).
58 JONSEN, supra note 15, at 26-27.
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newest terminology refers to this practice as donation after cardiac
death (DCD).
In spite of there being specific statutory guidance on this
issue-almost all states have adopted a version of the Uniform
Determination of Death Act ("UDDA")-there is a significant
controversy about whether organs are regularly being removed from
DCD donors prior to the time that they meet the legal criteria for being
dead.59 The growing legal literature on this issue addresses many of the
same questions that philosophers would ask. Are there fundamental
concepts we have in mind-concepts that are embedded in the
UDDA-when we decide that someone is dead? The current protocols
for removing organs in the DCD context allow a person to be declared
dead even though that person could later end up being brought back to
life. They allow persons to be declared dead even though they might
still have continuing brain function. We are again discovering that core
ideas about the nature of our being, long thought settled, can revive
themselves to present challenging new issues.
Conclusion
Over the coming years, issues in bioethics will no doubt continue to
attract a great deal of media attention, and play a growing role in'public
policy debates. Jonsen's book is an excellent starting point for
beginning an exploration of this field. And hopefully it will lead many
readers to a further and deeper inquiry--delving into both the
philosophical and legal literature, each of which has much to contribute
to "alleviat[ing] the human predicament." 60
59 See, e.g., ROBERT M. ARNOLD ET AL., PROCURING ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT: THE
DEBATE OVER NON-HEART-BEATING CADAVER PROTOCOLS (1995); Jerry Menikoff,
Doubts About Death: The Silence of the Institute of Medicine, 26 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 157 (1998); Jerry Menikoff, The Importance of Being Dead. Non-Heart-
Beating Organ Donation, 18 ISSUES L. MED. 3 (2002); MENIKOFF, supra note 57, at
462-66.
60 JONSEN, supra note 15, at 21.
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